Consumer Shopping Costs as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism by Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa von Schlippenbach
Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung
www.diw.de
Stéphane Caprice • Vanessa von Schlippenbach
Berlin, June 2010
Consumer Shopping Costs  













































© DIW Berlin, 2010 
 
DIW Berlin 
German Institute for Economic Research 
Mohrenstr. 58 
10117 Berlin 
Tel. +49 (30) 897 89-0 
Fax +49 (30) 897 89-200 
http://www.diw.de 
 
ISSN print edition 1433-0210 
ISSN electronic edition 1619-4535 
 
Available for free downloading from the DIW Berlin website. 
 
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin are indexed in RePEc and SSRN. 





 Consumer Shopping Costs as a Cause of
Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism
StØphane Caprice ￿ Vanessa von Schlippenbach yz
April 2010
Abstract
Analyzing a sequential bargaining framework with one retailer and two
suppliers of substitutable goods, we show that slotting fees may emerge
as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism when consumer shopping costs
are taken into account. If consumers economize on their shopping costs
by bundling their purchases, their buying decision depends rather on the
price for the whole shopping basket than on individual product prices. This
induces complementarities between the goods o⁄ered at a retail outlet.
If the complementarity e⁄ect resulting from shopping costs dominates
the original substitution e⁄ect, the wholesale price negotiated with the
￿rst supplier is upward distorted in order to shift rent from the second
supplier. As long as the ￿rst supplier has only little bargaining power,
she compensates the retailer for the upward distorted wholesale price by
paying a slotting fee. We also show that banning slotting fees causes per-
unit price to fall and welfare to increase.
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11 Introduction
In the grocery industry it has become a widespread practice that retailers charge
slotting fees to their suppliers. Basically, manufacturers have to pay a fee to get
their products placed in the retailers￿store shelves. These payments are made
for both the initial access to the retailers￿shelves in the case of new products
as well as the continuing access in the case of already established products.
In addition, retailers demand for a wide number of add-on fees such as promo-
tional, advertising and stocking allowances. These fees di⁄er greatly with respect
to the product, manufacturer, and market conditions. The average amount of
(so-called) slotting fees per item, per retailer and per metropolitan area ranges
from $2,313 to $21,768 (FTC 2003). Moreoever, slotting fees vary widely within
product categories. The importance of slotting allowances in the relationship
between retailers and manufacturers has dramatically increased since the late
1980ies. At the same time, the retail industry, particularly in Europe, has gone
through a profound consolidation process that has limited the suppliers￿trad-
ing alternatives (EC 1999, OFT 1998). Thus, goods have to pass through ￿the
decision-making screen of a single dominant retailer￿ to be distributed to ￿-
nal consumers (FTC 2001). In particular, small manufacturers often complain
that they are more likely to pay slotting fees than large manufacturers (FTC
2001, 2003).1 However, the retailer￿ s bargaining power does not su¢ ce to ex-
plain the emergence of slotting fees in supplier-retailer relationships, as large
retailers like Wal-Mart and Costco with tremendous bargaining power vis-￿-vis
their suppliers never charge slotting fees (FTC 2001).
The grocery industry is also characterized by the increasing preference of con-
sumers to bundle their purchases to economize on their shopping costs. That
is, consumers prefer to concentrate purchases with a single retailer avoiding ad-
ditional shopping costs when using additional retailers. In the UK, about 70%
of consumers practice such a so-called one-stop shopping behavior in spend-
ing about 80% of their weekly expenditures for fast moving consumer goods
on a weekly main trip (UK Competition Commission 2000). If consumers bun-
dle their purchases, their buying decision depends on the price for the whole
shopping basket rather than on individual product prices. This induces positive
1For example, the investigation of the Heinz-Beechnut "baby-food" merger has shown
that the market leader for babyfood does not pay slotting fees to retailers, while the smaller
competitors do (Innes and Hamilton 2006).
2demand externalities, i.e. complementarity between the products o⁄ered at a
retail outlet.2
Our paper provides a new explanation for the emergence of slotting fees in
supplier-retailer relationships by explicitly taking into account consumer shop-
ping costs.3 Referring to positive demand externalities due to shopping costs, we
show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism in a
three-party negotiation framework with complete information. We depart from
the literature demonstrating that slotting fees are introduced for signaling or
screening purposes (Kelly 1992, Chu 1992, DeVuyst 2005 and Sullivan 1997).4
We consider a monopolistic retailer that negotiates sequentially with two sup-
pliers of substitutable products. In a similar framework Marx and Sha⁄er (1999)
show that below-cost pricing in intermediate good markets can arise as it allows
the retailer and the ￿rst supplier to extract rents from the second supplier. This
is due to the fact that the retailer￿ s disagreement payo⁄with the second supplier
is decreasing in the price at which she can buy additional units from the ￿rst
supplier. Accordingly, downward distortion of the wholesale price with the ￿rst
supplier improves the retailer￿ s disagreement payo⁄ in the second negotiation
and, thus, allows the ￿rst supplier and the retailer to extract rents from the sec-
ond supplier. Taking consumer shopping costs explicitly into account, we show
that the wholesale price negotiated with the ￿rst supplier can also be upward
distorted. Upward distortion occurs if the positive demand externalities result-
ing from consumer shopping costs outweigh the original substitution e⁄ect. In
this case, a higher wholesale price for the ￿rst good does not only reduce the
demand for that good, it also lowers the demand for the second good. This, in
turn, diminishes the incremental contribution of the second supplier to the joint
pro￿t with the retailer. Hence, the retailer￿ s bargaining position in the second
negotiation improves which enables the ￿rst supplier and the retailer to extract
rents from the second supplier. However, the upward distorted wholesale price
makes the ￿rst supplier the residual claimant of the rent shifted from the second
supplier. To share the rent with the retailer, the ￿rst supplier pays a ￿xed fee to
the retailer as long as her bargaining power is su¢ ciently low. Thus, slotting fees
2For an early account of consumer shopping behavior and the related positive demand
externalities, see Stahl (1982 and 1987) and Beggs (1994).
3Following Sha⁄er (1991), we de￿ne slotting allowances as a negative ￿xed transfer in a
two-part tari⁄ contract between a manufacturer and a retailer.
4In a similar vein (sharing risk explanation), see Nocke and Thanassoulis (2010).
3may emerge in a sequential bargaining framework when consumers bundle their
purchases to economize on their shopping costs. A ban of slotting fees would
disable the ￿rst supplier to compensate the retailer for a higher wholesale price.
Thus, a ban of slotting fees would reduce the extent of upward distortion in the
￿rst negotiation leading to a higher social welfare.
We further aim at explaining why some suppliers pay slotting fees, while their
competitors do not. For this purpose, we endogenize the order of negotiation.
Considering di⁄erent degrees of exogenously given bargaining power for the
suppliers, we show that the retailer prefers to negotiate ￿rst with the weaker
supplier in order to improve her bargaining position vis-￿-vis the stronger sup-
plier. Since slotting fees are only paid by the ￿rst supplier, suppliers with little
bargaining power are more likely to pay slotting fees than market or brand
leaders. Moreover, we ￿nd that powerful retailers do not charge slotting fees.
These retailers already capture a large share of the overall industry pro￿t such
that their incentive to distort wholesale prices for strategic purposes is relatively
low. This is consistent with the observation that the largest and most powerful
retailers like Wal-Mart or Costco never charge slotting fees to their suppliers
(FTC 2001).
Our paper contributes to the literature on slotting fees based on the strate-
gic use of contracts in vertically related industries.5 Sha⁄er (1991) shows that
slotting fees can constitute a facilitating mechanism for softening competition in
downstream markets. In the context of multi-product markets, Innes and Hamil-
ton (2006) demonstrate how a monopolistic supplier and competitive retailers
can use slotting fees to obtain vertically integrated monopoly pro￿ts. Moreover,
Miklos-Thal et al. (2009) and Bedre (2008) ￿nd that slotting fees constitute a
means to internalize intrabrand contracting externalities. Slotting fees can also
be used in order to exclude competitors at both the upstream (Sha⁄er 2005)
and the downstream level (Marx and Sha⁄er 2007b). In this literature, the emer-
gence of slotting fees mainly refers to the presence of retail competition.6 Marx
and Sha⁄er (2009) depart from this literature by showing that slotting fees may
allow the retailer to capture more e¢ ciently the value of her shelf space when
shelf space is scarce without taking into account downstream competition. In our
5This literature on the strategic use of contracts in vertically related markets is based on
the seminal papers of Bonnano and Vickers (1988) as well as Rey and Stiglitz (1988). For
more details, see Caillaud and Rey (1995).
6See also, Foros and Kind (2008) and Kuksov and Pazgal (2007).
4paper the emergence of slotting fees does also not depend on retail competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we specify
our model taking into account consumer shopping behavior. We then analyze
subgame perfect equilibria of the game in Section 3. Welfare implications are
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 extends our basic framework to endogenize the
order of negotiations. Finally, we summarize our results and conclude.
2 Model
Consider a vertical structure with two upstream ￿rms Ui; i = 1;2; and a down-
stream ￿rm D: Each upstream ￿rm produces a single good. Goods are imperfect
substitutes, whereas U1 produces good 1 and U2 produces good 2: The upstream
￿rms sell their goods to the downstream retailer for subsequent distribution to
￿nal consumers: While the upstream ￿rms bear positive constant marginal costs
of production, i.e. 0 < c < 1; the downstream ￿rm￿ s marginal costs of distribu-
tion are normalized to zero. All ￿rms incur zero ￿xed costs.
Negotiations. We assume that the downstream ￿rm negotiates sequentially
with her suppliers about a two-part supply tari⁄ Ti(wi;Fi), which entails a lin-
ear wholesale price wi and a ￿xed fee Fi: Thus, the retailer negotiates ￿rst with
supplier U1 and then enters into negotiations with supplier U2. Each retailer-
supplier pair aims at maximizing its respective joint pro￿t when determining the
wholesale price.7 The surplus is divided such that each party gets her disagree-
ment payo⁄ plus a share of the incremental gains from trade, with proportion
￿i 2 [0;1] going to the supplier and with proportion 1￿￿i going to the retailer.
In the case of ￿i = 0 the retailer makes take-it or leave-it o⁄ers to the suppliers
Ui; while the opposite occurs if ￿i = 1:
Demand. In modelling consumer behavior, we follow the approach by Stahl
(1982). Consumers are uniformly distributed with density one along a line of
in￿nite length. Consumer￿ s location is denoted by ￿ 2 [￿1;1]: In addition to
goods 1 and 2; the economy involves a numeraire good 0: While the numeraire is
available everywhere along the line, both consumer goods have to be purchased
at the retail store which is located at ￿
D: Without loss of generality we assume
7For a non-cooperative foundation of the generalized Nash bargaining solution, see Binmore
et al. (1986).
5￿
D = 0: Consumers incur transportation cost t per unit distance. A consumer,
thus, bears shopping costs of ￿t when shopping at the retailer. Consumers are
identical in income I and preferences, their gross utility is given by










where ￿ 2 [0;1) indicates the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and
2: In the case of ￿ = 0 goods are independent, while goods are substitutes for
￿ > 0. The more ￿ approaches 1 the more the products are substitutable. The
utility function is separable in the numeraire x0.8
Given that both goods are distributed by the retailer at prices pi;i = 1;2 and
the price for the numeraire is normalized to one, the utility-maximizing demand
of a consumer located at ￿ refers to9
e x0 (p1;p2;￿); e x1(p1;p2); e x2(p1;p2) = arg max
x0;x1;x2
U(x0;x1;x2) (2)
s.t. x0 + p1x1 + p2x2 + j￿jt ￿ I:
Consumers refrain from shopping at the retailer if their utility from local con-
sumption and thus from purchasing only the numeraire exceeds their maximal
utility from buying at the retailer, i.e.
U(I;0;0) = I ￿ U(e x0(p1;p2;￿); e x1(p1;p2); e x2(p1;p2)): (3)
Accordingly, the set of consumers who are indi⁄erent whether to buy at the
retailer or not is given by
f￿jU(e x0(p1;p2;￿); e x1(p1;p2); e x2(p1;p2)) = Ig. (4)
Combining (2) and (4), good i0s overall demand in the market is given by
e Xi(pi;pj) = 2e xi(pi;pj)~ ￿(pi;pj); (5)














8This assumption allows us to get computable results. Consumptions in goods 1 and 2
of a consumer located at ￿ do not depend on the distance ￿ from the retailer as long as
consumptions are positive.
9To simplify notations, some arguments are omitted in the demand functions.
6Demand functions are continuous in all variables. Di⁄erentiating (5) with respect
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(6)
if e xi(pi;pj) > 0 with i = 1;2;i 6= j:
Obviously, @e xi(pi;pj)=@pj indicates the standard substitution e⁄ect. It deter-
mines how the individual consumer￿ s demand for good i is a⁄ected by the price
pj. As both goods are imperfect substitutes, this e⁄ect is strictly positive. How-
ever, @~ ￿(p1;p2)=@pj quanti￿es the impact of price pj on the size of the market,
i.e. on the mass of consumers buying at the retailer. The latter e⁄ect is negative
as consumers bundle their purchases of both goods to economize on their shop-
ping costs. That is, a higher price for good j induces a higher price for the whole
shopping basket such that less consumers are willing to buy at the retailer. Thus,
complementary arises between goods 1 and 2 as a higher price for one product
reduces not only the demand for this respective product but also the demand for
the other product o⁄ered by the retailer. Note that the complementarity e⁄ect
occurs although goods are substitutable from a consumption point of view.10
Due to these two countervailing e⁄ects, i.e. complementarity and substitution
at the same time, overall demand for good i reacts ambiguously to an increasing
price of good j:
Let us now consider the case, where the retailer only o⁄ers good i. Consumer
utility from consumption then refers to




i, 8i = 1;2 (7)
yielding the utility-maximizing demands
e x0(pi;1;￿); e xi(pi;1) = argmax
x0;xi
U(x0;xi;0) (8)
s.t. x0 + pixi + j￿jt ￿ I:
The set of consumers who are indi⁄erent between visiting the retail store or
staying with local consumption of the numeraire is then given by
f￿jU(e x0(pi;1;￿); e xi(pi;1);0) = Ig: (9)
10For more details, see Stahl (1987).
7The overall market demand, then, refers to
e Xi(pi;1) = 2e xi(pi;1)~ ￿(pi;1) (10)
where






Pro￿ts. Using the respective demand function as well as the properties of the
bargaining process in the intermediate goods market, we specify the pro￿t func-
tions of the downstream retailer and the upstream suppliers as
￿D
1;2 = e R(p1;p2) ￿
2 P
i=1
Fi; i 6= j; i = 1;2 (11)
with : e R(p1;p2) =
2 P
i=1




1;2 = (wi ￿ c) e Xi (p1;p2) + Fi; with i = 1;2;i 6= j; (12)
respectively. Summarizing, we solve the following three-stage game: In the ￿rst
stage, the retailer negotiates with supplier U1 about a two-part delivery con-
tract. Negotiation with supplier U2 takes place in the second stage. Finally, the
retailer sets prices and consumers make their purchase decision. We proceed by
backward induction where our solution concept corresponds to subgame perfec-
tion.
3 Equilibrium analysis
By working backwards, we solve for the equilibrium strategies of the downstream
retailer and the upstream suppliers taking the order of negotiation as given. We
relax this assumption in Section 5.
Stage 3 - Downstream Prices. Taking the contracts with each supplier as
given, the retailer sets the prices for both goods in the last stage of the game.
Maximizing (11) with respect to p1 and p2; we obtain the equilibrium down-
stream prices p￿
1(w1;w2) and p￿
2(w1;w2):11 We denote the equilibrium utility
11Due to the symmetry of linear demands resulting from u(x1;x2) and the separability of
the utility function in the numeraire, i.e. U(x0;x1;x2) = x0 + u(x1;x2); we get a simple
expression for p￿
i (wi;wj) and p￿
i (wi;1); i.e. p￿
i (wi;wj) = p￿
i (wi;1) = 1
4 (1 + 3wi):
8maximizing demand, i.e. e xi(p￿
1;p￿
2); as well as the overall equilibrium demand;
i.e. e Xi(p￿
1;p￿
2); as xi(w1;w2) and Xi(w1;w2); respectively. The same holds for
~ ￿(p￿
1;p￿
2) and e R(p￿
1;p￿
2) that we denote as ￿(w1;w2) and R(w1;w2): For later
reference note that @Xi(wi;c)=@wi < 0: The reduced pro￿t functions of the
downstream and the upstream ￿rms are, thus, given by
￿D￿






1;2 = (wi ￿ c)Xi(w1;w2) + Fi; (14)
if the retailer sells both products to ￿nal consumers. If, however, only the up-
stream ￿rm U1 supplies the retailer, we denote the reduced pro￿t functions as
￿D￿
1;0 = R(w1;1) ￿ F1 (15)
￿
U1￿
1;0 = (w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;1) + F1; (16)
while the upstream ￿rm U2 makes zero pro￿t, i.e. ￿
U2￿
1;0 = 0: Analogously, if the
retailer fails to achieve an agreement with supplier U1; the respective reduced
pro￿t functions are given by
￿D￿
0;2 = R(1;w2) ￿ F2 (17)
￿
U1￿
0;2 = 0; ￿
U2￿
0;2 = (w2 ￿ c)X2(1;w2) + F2: (18)
Stage 2 - Negotiation with the second supplier. In the second stage of
the game the downstream ￿rm negotiates with the second supplier U2 about a
two-part tari⁄ T2(w2;F2). The ￿rms take the contract T1(w1;F1) with the ￿rst
supplier U1 as given when they determine T2(w2;F2). Using the reduced pro￿t
functions, the equilibrium bargaining outcome of the retailer and the second












The supplier￿ s disagreement payo⁄ equals zero as the suppliers do not have any
alternative to get their goods distributed if they fail to achieve an agreement
with the retailer. In the case of negotiation break-down with one supplier, the
retailer may still sell the competitor￿ s good. Solving (19) for the equilibrium
wholesale price b w2 and the equilibrium ￿xed fee b F2, we obtain:
9Lemma 1 If the gains from trade between the retailer and the second supplier
U2 are positive, there exists a unique equilibrium with
b w2 = c and b F2 (w1) = ￿2 (R(w1;c) ￿ R(w1;1)):
Proof. See Appendix.
As the negotiation outcome between the retailer and the second supplier does not
a⁄ect the contract chosen in the ￿rst stage, they have no incentive to distort the
wholesale price in the second stage. The equilibrium wholesale price, therefore,
equals marginal cost and maximizes the joint pro￿t of the retailer and the second
supplier. This makes the retailer the residual claimant to the joint pro￿t. As to
share the joint pro￿t the retailer pays a lump-sum fee b F2 (w1) to the supplier
U2: This payment corresponds to the supplier￿ s incremental contribution to the
joint pro￿t weighted according to her bargaining power.
Considering that the retailer and the ￿rst supplier fail to achieve an agreement
in the ￿rst stage of the game, the retailer￿ s outside option when negotiating
with the second supplier refers to zero. In this out-of-equilibrium event, the
negotiated wholesale price is still equal to the marginal cost, while the ￿xed
fee F2 refers to b F2 (1) = ￿2R(1;c). Then, the second supplier gets a payo⁄ of
￿2R(1;c), and the retailer earns (1 ￿ ￿2)R(1;c):
Stage 1 - Negotiation with the ￿rst supplier. Anticipating the equilibrium
strategies in stages two and three, the retailer and the ￿rst supplier negotiate
about a two-part delivery tari⁄ T1(w1;F1). While the disagreement pro￿t of
the upstream supplier refers to zero, the outside option of the retailer equals
￿D￿
0;2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)R(1;c): Using our previous results, the pro￿ts of both the
upstream supplier U1 and the downstream retailer are given by
￿D￿
1;2 = R(w1;c) ￿ F1 ￿ b F2 (w1) (20)




1;2 = (w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;c) + F1; (21)
respectively. Thus, the equilibrium bargaining outcome of the retailer and the












10Maximizing (22) with respect to w1 and F1 and rearranging terms, we obtain
@
@w1
[(w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;c) + R(w1;c)] ￿ ￿2
@
@w1
[R(w1;c) ￿ R(w1;1)] = 0: (23)
The ￿rst term of (23) determines the impact of an increasing w1 on the overall
industry pro￿t. It becomes zero if the wholesale price equals marginal cost, i.e.
w1 = c: In turn, the second term refers to the impact of an increasing w1 on the
incremental contribution of the second supplier U2 (see Lemma 1). Depending
on the sign of the second term, the retailer and the ￿rst supplier tend to upward
or downward distort the wholesale price w1.
Lemma 2 If trade takes place between the retailer and the ￿rst supplier U1;
there exists a unique equilibrium wholesale price that is either downward or
upward distorted, i.e.
b w1 = c ￿
￿2 (X1(b w1;c) ￿ X1(b w1;1))
@X1(b w1;c)=@w1
: (24)
The respective ￿xed fee refers to
b F1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿1)(b w1 ￿ c)X1(b w1;c) (25)
+￿1 [(1 ￿ ￿2)[R(b w1;c) ￿ R(1;c)] + ￿2R(b w1;1)]:
Proof. See Appendix.
The distortion of the wholesale price in the ￿rst stage enables the retailer to
extract rent from the second supplier. The direction of distortion is indicated by
the sign of ￿X = X1(b w1;c) ￿ X1(b w1;1):12 For ￿X > 0 the wholesale price is
upward distorted, while it is downward distorted as long as ￿X ￿ 0: The actual
sign of e X1(b w1;c)￿ e X1(b w1;1) depends on the trade-o⁄between the substitution
e⁄ect, i.e. x1(b w1;c) ￿ x1(b w1;1) < 0; and the complementarity e⁄ect induced
by consumer one-stop shopping behavior, i.e. ￿(b w1;c) ￿ ￿(b w1;1) > 0:
Lemma 3 There exists a threshold ￿k that is implicitly given by X1(c;c;￿) ￿
X1(c;1): For all ￿ < ￿k (￿ ￿ ￿k) the wholesale price negotiated with the
￿rst supplier is upward (downward) distorted. The extent of the distortion, i.e.
jb w1 ￿ cj; is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier, i.e. ￿2:
12This is true since @ e Xi(wi;c)=@wi < 0 always holds.
11Proof. See Appendix.
As long as products are su¢ ciently strong substitutes (￿ ￿ ￿k), the substitu-
tion e⁄ect dominates the complementarity e⁄ect. This provides the retailer and
the ￿rst supplier with an incentive to negotiate a per-unit price that undercuts
marginal costs.13 That is, a lower wholesale price for the ￿rst good increases the
retailer￿ s opportunity costs of buying from the second supplier. This strengthens
the retailer￿ s disagreement payo⁄ in the negotiation with the second supplier.




e⁄ect dominates the substitution e⁄ect. The positive demand externalities re-
sulting from shopping costs imply that an increasing wholesale price for good
1 does not only reduce the demand for good 1; it also lowers the demand for
good 2: Correspondingly, upward distortion of the wholesale price reduces the
incremental contribution of the second supplier in the case of highly di⁄eren-
tiated products and enables the retailer and the ￿rst supplier to extract rents
from the second supplier. The direction of distortion, therefore, depends on the
degree of product di⁄erentiation. The more di⁄erentiated the products are the
more likely the wholesale price is upward distorted (Figure 1).
The bargaining power of the second supplier, i.e. ￿2; has no impact on whether
the wholesale price is upward or downward distorted. It only a⁄ects the extent of
distortion (see (24)). The distortion of the wholesale price induces ine¢ ciencies
which have to be compensated by the bene￿t of shifting rent from the second
supplier. That is, the retailer distorts the wholesale price with the ￿rst supplier
to get a larger share of a smaller pie. Though the distortion of the wholesale price
increases the share of the overall pro￿t for the ￿rst supplier and the retailer, it
reduces the overall pro￿t at the same time. Accordingly, the retailer and the ￿rst
supplier have hardly any incentive to distort the wholesale price if the retailer
has a strong bargaining position vis-￿-vis the second supplier.
If the wholesale price undercuts marginal costs, i.e. ￿ ￿ ￿k; the retailer has to
compensate the ￿rst supplier by paying a ￿xed fee. Otherwise the ￿rst supplier￿ s
participation constraint would be violated. If instead, the wholesale price is
upward distorted, i.e. ￿ < ￿k; it is rather the case that the ￿rst supplier and
the retailer share the rent shifted from the second supplier by a slotting fee paid
by the ￿rst supplier. The ￿rst supplier gets a larger share of the shifted rent
13Note that the result where the substitution e⁄ect dominates coincides with the ￿ndings
of Marx and Sha⁄er (1999).
12Figure 1: Wholesale price b w1 in ￿ 2 (0;1) for c = 0:1
from the second supplier the higher her bargaining power vis-￿-vis the retailer.
Accordingly, the ￿xed fee F1 is increasing in the ￿rst supplier￿ s bargaining power,
i.e. ￿1:14 There exists a threshold ￿
k
1, which is implicitly given by b F1(￿
k
1) ￿ 0:




(b w1 ￿ c)X1(b w1;c)
(b w1 ￿ c)X1(b w1;c) + (1 ￿ ￿2)(R(b w1;c) ￿ R(1;c)) + ￿2R(b w1;1)
: (26)
For all ￿1 < ￿
k
1, the ￿rst supplier pays a slotting fee to the retailer. Comparative
statics further show that ￿
k
1 is increasing in ￿2: Hence, the retailer is more likely
to charge slotting fees from the ￿rst supplier the more bargaining power the
second supplier has. Our results further reveal that the higher the bargaining
power of the second supplier, i.e. the higher ￿2; and the lower the bargaining
power of the ￿rst supplier, i.e. the lower ￿1; the higher the slotting fees the ￿rst
supplier has to pay. That is, a higher bargaining power of the second supplier
makes it more pro￿table for the retailer to distort the wholesale price with the
￿rst supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. In addition, the ￿rst
supplier is more likely to compensate the retailer for the increased wholesale
14Note that the derivative d b F1=d￿1is strictly positive as we obtain d b F1=d￿1 = (b w1 ￿
c)X1(b w1;c) + (1 ￿ ￿2)[R(b w1;c) ￿ R(1;c)] + ￿2R(b w1;1) > 0:
13price the lower her bargaining power.
Proposition 1 The retailer charges slotting fees from the ￿rst supplier if prod-
ucts are su¢ ciently strongly di⁄erentiated, i.e. ￿ < ￿k; and if the ￿rst supplier￿ s
bargaining power is relatively low, i.e. ￿1 < ￿
k
1. Furthermore, comparative sta-
tics reveal that slotting fees are more likely to occur if the second supplier￿ s




Obviously, slotting fees do not arise if the retailer makes take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers,
i.e. ￿1 = ￿2 = 0: Due to her exogenously given bargaining power the retailer
captures overall pro￿ts such that she has no incentive to distort the wholesale
price in the ￿rst negotiation. Thus, slotting fees would never occur. This result
may coincide with the observation that large and powerful retailers like Wal-
Mart or Costco never ask for slotting fees (FTC 2001).
4 Social Welfare
Our previous analysis has shown that slotting fees arise as a result of a rent-
shifting mechanism in a sequential bargaining framework. However, slotting fees
do not occur if the retailer negotiates simultaneously with her suppliers imply-
ing wholesale prices for both products equal to marginal costs ("marginal-cost
pricing regime"). In order to assess the welfare implications of slotting fees, we
compare social welfare in the case of an upward distorted wholesale price in the
￿rst negotiation with the social welfare under a marginal-cost pricing regime.
Social welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and overall industry















































X1(w1;c) < 0: (29)
Hence, consumer surplus is strictly decreasing in w1 indicating that a higher
degree of upward distortion negatively a⁄ects consumer surplus. In turn, below-
cost pricing occurring in the case of strong substitutes bene￿ts consumers. The
overall industry pro￿t, however, is maximized for a wholesale price equal to
marginal costs because of
@￿
@w1
= (w1 ￿ c)
@X1(w1;c)
@w1
7 0 for w1 ? c:
While the overall industry pro￿t is increasing in w1 for all w1 ￿ c; it is decreasing
for all w1 > c: Hence, an upward distortion of the wholesale price negotiated
with the ￿rst supplier reduces both consumer surplus as well as industry pro￿t
compared to the marginal-cost pricing regime. Accordingly, we can state:
Lemma 4 Slotting fees induced by a rent-shifting mechanism and an upward
distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the ￿rst supplier imply a welfare
loss.
Note that slotting fees simply serve as a means of transferring rents from the
￿rst supplier to the retailer. Thus, they do not a⁄ect social welfare. The welfare
loss rather refers to the upward distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with
the ￿rst supplier which is the precondition for the emergence of slotting fees in
vertical relations. The retailer￿ s incentive to optimally distort the wholesale price
in the ￿rst negotiation is limited if there is no possibility to get rents transferred
from the ￿rst supplier as in the case of forbidden slotting fees.
Considering the negotiations of the retailer and the ￿rst supplier when slotting
fees are forbidden, i.e. under the constraint that F1 ￿ 0; the bargaining outcome
is characterized by










￿1￿￿1 s.t. F1 ￿ 0: (30)
15As the constraint F1 ￿ 0 is binding for all ￿1 < ￿
k
1; we get:
Proposition 2 If slotting fees are prohibited, the wholesale price in the ￿rst
negotiation is less distorted, i.e. e w1 < b w1 if ￿1 < ￿
k
1 and e w1 = b w1 otherwise.
Note the distortion of the wholesale price is increasing in the bargaining power
of the ￿rst supplier, i.e. de w1=d￿1 > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
Under a ban of slotting fees there is no possibility to shift rents from the ￿rst
supplier to the retailer. Accordingly, the retailer and the ￿rst supplier have to
share their joint pro￿t by a linear wholesale price. Obviously, this reduces the
retailer￿ s incentive to distort the wholesale price in the ￿rst negotiation since
transfers are not allowed through slotting fees. As a ban of slotting fees makes
the upward distortion of the wholesale price in the ￿rst negotiation less attrac-
tive, it reduces the ine¢ ciencies in the ￿rst negotiation. Thus, social welfare is
increasing if the use of slotting fees in vertical relations is forbidden. Moreover,
the retailer￿ s incentive to distort the wholesale price in the ￿rst negotiation is
likewise reduced the more bargaining power the retailer has. In other words,
the more bargaining power the retailer has the more she tends to maximize the
overall industry pro￿t.
5 Order of Negotiation
So far, we have taken the order of negotiations as exogenous. We relax this
assumption in order to examine whether suppliers with relatively strong or rela-
tively low bargaining power are more likely to be the ￿rst the retailer negotiates
with. For this purpose we introduce a zero stage, where the retailer decides with
whom of her suppliers she negotiates ￿rst. Without loss of generality, we assume
that supplier U1 has less bargaining power than supplier U2, i.e. ￿1 < ￿2:
Our previous results indicate that the distortion of the wholesale price is increas-
ing in the bargaining power of the second supplier. If the retailer negotiates ￿rst
with the weaker supplier, i.e. U1; the distortion becomes larger, but the bene￿ts
from rent-shifting are increasing too. However, when negotiating ￿rst with the
stronger supplier, i.e. U2, there is less distortion of the wholesale price, but also
the gains from rent-shifting are lower. It turns out that the retailer is strictly
16better o⁄ when negotiating ￿rst with the weaker supplier in order to improve
her bargaining position vis-￿-vis the stronger supplier.15
Proposition 3 The retailer prefers to negotiate ￿rst with the less powerful sup-
plier. This implies that the supplier with the lower bargaining power is more likely
to pay a slotting fee than the supplier with the higher bargaining power. Further-
more, the endogenous order of negotiation makes the emergence of slotting fees
more likely.
As the distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the ￿rst supplier is
increasing in the second supplier￿ s bargaining power (see Proposition 1), our
results imply the following:
Corollary The choice of the retailer to negotiate ￿rst with the less powerful
supplier compared to a regime, where she negotiates ￿rst with the more powerful
supplier is welfare decreasing for all ￿ < ￿k.
Due to the retailer￿ s preference to negotiate ￿rst with the weaker supplier, the
supplier with the relatively higher level of bargaining power never pays slotting
fees. In turn, the supplier with the lower level of bargaining power is charged
a slotting fee as long as her bargaining power is su¢ ciently low. Moreover, the
higher the bargaining power of the second supplier the more likely the ￿rst sup-
plier has to pay a slotting fee to the retailer, since @￿
k
1=@￿2 > 0 (see Proposition
1).
Our ￿ndings con￿rm the concerns of small manufacturers which are commonly
associated with a low level of bargaining power. They complain that they have
to pay slotting fees to get their products distributed by the retailer, while their
larger competitors do not. We even ￿nd that the likelihood of slotting fees to be
paid by the small suppliers is increasing in the asymmetry of suppliers. That is,
the more bargaining power the second supplier has compared to the bargaining
power of the ￿rst supplier, the more likely slotting fees are charged by the
retailer.
15Similar results have been obtained by Marx and Sha⁄er (2007a). However, we extend their
work by allowing for rent shifting contracts as introduced in Marx and Sha⁄er (1999). In Marx
and Sha⁄er (1999) as well as in our model quantities are generally distorted such that they
do not maximize the overall joint payo⁄ of all three parties.
176 Conclusion
We have shown that a rent-shifting mechanism in a three-party negotiation
framework results in slotting fees to be paid by manufacturers if consumers
bear shopping costs. We consider a simple vertical structure with one retailer
that negotiates sequentially with two upstream suppliers of imperfect substi-
tutes about a non-linear delivery contract. Both goods are supposed to belong
to consumer shopping basket. Taking consumer shopping costs explicitly into
account, positive demand externalities arise between both goods o⁄ered at the
retailer. If this complementarity e⁄ect dominates the original substitution e⁄ect,
the wholesale price in the ￿rst negotiation is upward distorted. This reduces the
demand for the ￿rst product. At the same time, it lowers the demand for the
second good because of the complementarity induced by consumer shopping
costs. Thus, the bargaining position of the retailer vis-￿-vis the second supplier
improves and enables the retailer together with the ￿rst supplier to shift rent
from the second. In this case, slotting fees are used to share the shifted rent as
the ￿rst supplier becomes residual claimant to the shifted rent.
Our model allows us to explain why slotting fees may vary within categories.
That is, the supplier the retailer negotiates ￿rst with might pay slotting fees,
while the second supplier never does. We further show that the retailer has al-
ways an incentive to negotiate ￿rst with the weaker supplier in order to improve
her bargaining position vis-￿-vis the more powerful second supplier. Accordingly,
our analysis reveals various hypotheses that are empirically testable. First, slot-
ting allowances are more likely to be paid by suppliers with relatively little
bargaining power vis-￿-vis the retailer. Second, slotting allowances are more
likely to occur, the more suppliers di⁄er in their bargaining strength vis-￿-vis
the retailer. In other words, slotting fees are more likely to be charged by re-
tailers the more the producers in a particular product category di⁄er in their
bargaining power vis-￿-vis the retailer. We also ￿nd that powerful retailers never
charge slotting fees as they already capture a large share of the industry pro￿t.
In our framework, slotting fees are not necessarily used to exploit those suppliers
that pay them. At the opposite, they are induced by a rent-shifting mechanism
at the expenses of those suppliers that do not pay slotting fees, i.e. the more
powerful suppliers in the intermediate good market. That is, slotting fees serve as
a means to exploit rents from the more powerful suppliers the retailer negotiates
18in the second place with. Even though slotting fees only transfer rents between
vertically related agents, their occurrence comes along with a welfare loss. This
is due to the fact that slotting fees are induced by an upward distorted wholesale
price in the ￿rst negotiation. As wholesale prices are less distorted if slotting
fees are forbidden, we can state that a ban of slotting fees would improve social
welfare.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Maximizing (19) with respect to w2 and F2; we obtain































￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)￿
U2￿
1;2 = 0: (32)
































Using (34) and applying the envelope theorem, we get
(w2 ￿ c)@X2(w1;w2)=@w2 = 0: (35)
The equality is ful￿lled for
b w2 = c: (36)
Combining (36) together with (32), we obtain
b F2 (w1) = ￿2 (R(w1;c) ￿ R(w1;1)): (37)
Proof of Lemma 2: Maximizing (22) with respect to w1 and F1, we obtain































￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)￿
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= ￿X1(w1;c) + ￿2 (X1(w1;c) ￿ X1(w1;1)):
Using (38) and (39) and applying the envelope theorem, the equilibrium whole-
sale price b w1 is given by
b w1 = c ￿
￿2 (X1(b w1;c) ￿ X1(b w1;1))
@X1(b w1;c)=@w1
: (40)
Using (39), the ￿xed fee is given by
b F1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿1)(b w1 ￿ c)X1(b w1;c) (41)
+￿1 [(1 ￿ ￿2)[R(b w1;c) ￿ R(1;c)] + ￿2R(b w1;1)]:
Proof of Lemma 3. In order to prove the ￿rst part of Lemma 3, we assume
concavity of the objective function, i.e. the Nash Product formalized in (22).16
Reformulating (24), we obtain
￿(w1;￿) = (w1 ￿ c)
@X1(w1;c)
@w1
+ ￿2 (X1(w1;c) ￿ X1(w1;1)) (42)
with : ￿(b w1) = 0:
Substituting w1 = c; we get












Evaluating (43), we obtain that ￿(c) > 0 holds for all ￿ < ￿1 +
p
2: For
￿ ￿ ￿1 +
p
2 we get ￿(c) ￿ 0. Using the concavity of the objective function,
the equilibrium wholesale price satis￿es b w1 T c for ￿ S ￿1 +
p
2.
To prove the second part of Lemma 3, i.e. djb w1 ￿ cj=d￿2 > 0; we apply the
implicit function theorem to (42). Because of the concavity of (42) we have
sign[db w1=d￿2] = sign[@￿(b w1;￿2)=@￿2] = sign[X1(b w1;c) ￿ X1(b w1;1)]:The
16The concavity has been checked by simulations.
20analysis of X1(b w1;c)￿X1(b w1;1) reveals that @￿(w1;￿2)=@￿2 < 0 if X1(b w1;c)￿
X1(b w1;1) < 0 and b w1 < c implying db w1=d￿2 < 0: Otherwise it holds
that @￿(w1;￿2)=@￿2 > 0 if X1(b w1;c) ￿ X1(b w1;1) > 0and b w1 > c implying
db w1=d￿2 > 0: Hence, we have djb w1 ￿ cj=d￿2 > 0:
Proof of Proposition 1. The retailer charges slotting allowances from up-
stream suppliers as long as ￿ < ￿k and ￿1 < ￿
k
















Inspection of (25) directly implies that
db F1=d￿1 = (b w1 ￿ c)X1(b w1;c) + R(b w1;c) (45)
￿￿2 [R(b w1;c) ￿ R(b w1;1)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)R(1;c) > 0:
Hence the sign of d￿
k
1 (￿2)=d￿2 equals the sign of ￿db F1=d￿2 with









For any ￿ < ￿k, we know that ￿@ b F1=@￿2 > 0 since @ b F1=@￿2 =
￿￿1 [R(b w1;c) ￿ R(b w1;1) ￿ R(1;c)] < 0 and, @ b w1 (￿2)=@￿2 > 0 (see
Lemma 3). In turn, we have ￿db F1=d￿2 < 0 if ￿@ b F1=@w1 > 0: To get
￿@ b F1=@w1 > 0; we rewrite b F1 as the sum of two terms, ￿(b w1 ￿c)X1(b w1;c) and
￿1 [(b w1 ￿ c)X1(b w1;c) + R(b w1;c) ￿ ￿2 [R(b w1;c) ￿ R(b w1;1)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)R(1;c)].
The second term corresponds to the joint pro￿t of the ￿rst sup-
plier and the retailer weighted by ￿1. The derivative of this term
with respect to w1 is zero, i.e. ￿(b w1) = 0: This enables us to write















Since @ [R(w1;c)]=@w1 < 0 and @ [R(w1;1)]=@w1 < 0,
it follows that @ [(w1 ￿ c)X1(w1;c)]=@w1jw1=b w1 > 0: Since




21Proof of Proposition 2. Di⁄erentiating (30) with respect to w1, we obtain











@ [(w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;c)]
@w1
[(1 ￿ ￿2)(R(w1;c) ￿ R(1;c)) + ￿2R(w1;1)]
with: ￿(w1)jw1=e w1 = 0:
Using ￿(w1)jw1=b w1 = 0 (see 47), we can write
￿(w1)jw1=b w1 =





￿(1 ￿ ￿1)(w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;c)+













Note that the term in brackets T1 refers to b F1: Since @ (w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;c)=@w1 >
0 and b F1 < 0 for any ￿1 < ￿
k
1, it follows that ￿(w1)jw1=b w1 < 0: Assuming
concavity of the objective function, we get e w1 < b w1:
Applying the implicit function theorem, we analyze the comparative statics, i.e.
de w1=d￿1 > 0: We know that sign[de w1=d￿1] = sign[@￿=@￿1] with
@￿
@￿1











@ [(w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;c)]
@w1
[(1 ￿ ￿2)(R(w1;c) ￿ R(1;c)) + ￿2R(w1;1)]:
Reformulating and using previous results, we get
￿(e w1) =
￿1 [@￿(￿)=@￿1]















Since @R(w1;c)=@w1 < 0 and @R(w1;1)=@w1 < 0, we get from ￿(e w1) = 0 that
@￿(￿)=@￿1 > 0 implying de w1=d￿1 > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. Denoting the supplier the retailer negotiates ￿rst
with by index i and the second supplier by index j; the downstream ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t is given by
￿D
i;j (wi) = ￿i (1 ￿ ￿j)R(1;c) + (1 ￿ ￿i)[(wi ￿ c)Xi(wi;c) + R(wi;c)] (52)
￿(1 ￿ ￿i)￿j [R(wi;c) ￿ R(wi;1)]
with i = 1;2; i 6= j:
22We denote the wholesale prices negotiated at the ￿rst stage by w￿
1 if the re-
tailer negotiates ￿rst the supplier U1 (regime 1;2). Analogously, w￿
2 refers to
the wholesale price negotiated in the ￿rst stage, if the retailer negotiates ￿rst
the supplier U2 (regime 2;1). Since the distortion of the wholesale price in the
￿rst stage is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier, we have
0 < jw￿
2 ￿ cj < jw￿
























2) = (￿2 ￿ ￿1)[(w￿
2 ￿ c)Xi(w￿
2;c) + R(w￿
2;1) ￿ R(1;c)]: (53)




R(1;c) > 0: Denoting w1 the wholesale price negotiated in the ￿rst stage for
￿2 = 1; we get
￿
@ [(w1 ￿ c)X1 (w1;c) + R(w1;c)]
@w1
￿








We rewrite (54) by @A(w1)=@w1￿@B (w1)=@w1 = 0; where A(w1) denotes the
industry surplus and B (w1) the incremental contribution of the second supplier.
Using @A(w1)=@w1 < 0; @B (w1)=@w1 < 0 and A(w1)=@w1 ￿@B (w1)=@w1 >
0 for any w1 < w1; the concavity of objective function reveals
A(c) ￿ A(w1) < B (c) ￿ B (w1) 8 w1 < w1: (55)
Since jw￿
2 ￿ cj < jw1 ￿ cj (see Lemma 3), we obtain
A(c) ￿ A(w￿
2) < B (c) ￿ B (w￿
2) for w1 = w￿
2: (56)




2;1) ￿ R(1;c) > 0: (57)
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